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Abstract
The free-energy principle has recently been proposed as a unified Bayesian account of perception, learning and action.
Despite the inextricable link between emotion and cognition, emotion has not yet been formulated under this framework. A
core concept that permeates many perspectives on emotion is valence, which broadly refers to the positive and negative
character of emotion or some of its aspects. In the present paper, we propose a definition of emotional valence in terms of
the negative rate of change of free-energy over time. If the second time-derivative of free-energy is taken into account, the
dynamics of basic forms of emotion such as happiness, unhappiness, hope, fear, disappointment and relief can be
explained. In this formulation, an important function of emotional valence turns out to regulate the learning rate of the
causes of sensory inputs. When sensations increasingly violate the agent’s expectations, valence is negative and increases
the learning rate. Conversely, when sensations increasingly fulfil the agent’s expectations, valence is positive and decreases
the learning rate. This dynamic interaction between emotional valence and learning rate highlights the crucial role played
by emotions in biological agents’ adaptation to unexpected changes in their world.
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Introduction
Free-energy is an information theoretic quantity that upper
bounds the surprise on sampling some data, given a generative
model of how data were caused. The free-energy principle assumes
that biological agents encode a probabilistic model of the causes of
their sensations, and postulates that any adaptive agent that resists
a tendency to disorder must minimize its free-energy [1,2]. Under
simplifying (Gaussian) assumptions, free-energy minimization can
be understood as the minimization of the prediction error between
the actual and predicted sensory inputs. In order to comply with
the free-energy principle, adaptive agents have two tactics at their
disposal: (1) adjusting their internal states to generate more
accurate predictions and (2) acting on the environment to sample
sensations that fulfil their predictions. The principle is based upon
the realization that perceptual inference and learning [3,4] and
active inference [5,6] rest on the same Bayesian scheme.
Perceptual inference refers to inferring the states of the world
causing sensory inputs. Perceptual learning relates to learning the
relationship between inputs and causes. Active inference corre-
sponds to acting on the world to fulfil prior expectations about
sensory inputs. The computational implementation of the free-
energy principle has been shown to replicate in many aspects
neural mechanisms and the cortical organization of the brain
[4,7].
Crucially, when inferring and learning the causes of their
sensations in a changing world, adaptive agents need to deal with
different forms of uncertainty, namely estimation uncertainty [8],
volatility [9,10] and unexpected uncertainty [11,12]. Estimation
uncertainty refers to the known estimation variance of states of the
world causing sensory inputs and can be reduced through
learning. Volatility refers to slow and continuous changes in states
of the world, and has usually been modelled by making estimation
uncertainty follow some latent stochastic process [13]. Finally,
unexpected uncertainty arises from surprising sensory inputs
caused by discrete and fast changes in states of the world, and
calls for forgetting the past and restarting learning from new
sensory data. Dealing with different forms of uncertainty is
fundamental to Bayesian models of learning in a non-stationary
environment [14]. In fact, a critical challenge faced by many
recent Bayesian schemes of human learning is how to dynamically
update beliefs about states of the world in order to optimize
predictions in a changing environment [9–12,15–18].
Despite the major role attributed to emotions in influencing the
content and the strength of the agent’s beliefs and the resistance of
these beliefs to modification [19], emotion has not been considered
in - much less integrated into - these computational models. The
concept of emotional valence, or simply valence, has been used
among emotion researchers to refer to the positive and negative
character of emotion or some of its aspects, including elicitors
(events, objects), subjective experiences (feeling, affect) and
expressive behaviours (facial, bodily, verbal) [20]. The valence of
feelings has been argued to be a pivotal criterion for demarcating
emotion [21] and a core dimension of the subjective experience of
moods and emotions [22]. Traditionally, mood has been defined,
in contrast to emotion, as an affective state that lacks a clear
referent, changes slowly and lasts for an extended period of time
[23].
In the present paper, we propose a mathematical definition of
emotional valence in terms of the negative rate of change of free-
energy over time. As we shall see later, this formalism entails the
dynamic attribution of emotional valence to every state of the
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world that an adaptive agent might visit and prescribes the
dynamics of basic forms of emotion such as happiness, unhappiness,
hope, fear, disappointment and relief.
We will first introduce the free-energy principle and present
our computational model of emotional valence. We then
demonstrate this scheme by simulating and comparing two
artificial agents. One agent explicitly optimises posterior beliefs
about volatility and does not use its internally generated
emotional valence signal. The other does not estimate volatility
but instead implements the emotional regulation of estimation
uncertainty. The contribution of this work is two-fold. First, we
provide a phenomenological account of emotion in terms of
changes in free energy - as a proxy for changes in the quality of
how the world is being modelled during inference and learning.
Second, emotion is coupled back to inference using a form of
regularization or meta-learning. In other words, changes in the
quality of inference are used to regularize the rate of evidence
accumulation to provide adaptive learning rates. These learning
rates correspond to expected uncertainty about inferences, under
hierarchical models of the world.
Models
In this section, we introduce the free-energy principle as it was
originally proposed by Friston, Kilner and Harrison [1], and then
we propose a new mathematical definition of emotional valence
and some basic forms of emotion in terms of free-energy. Next, we
put forward a meta-learning rule by means of which emotional
valence regulates estimation uncertainty, and outline the relation-
ship between the dynamics of free-energy and some basic forms of
emotion.
The free-energy principle
In statistical physics, variational free-energy minimization is a
method for approximating a complex probability density p(q) by
a simpler ensemble density q(q; m) that is parametrized by
adjustable parameters m [24]. In neuroscience, the free-energy
principle assumes that biological agents encode the parameters m
of an arbitrary recognition (ensemble) density q(q; m) of
environmental quantities q that are the presumed causes of their
sensations [2]. The recognition density q(q; m) is an approxima-
tion to the true posterior density p(qD~s,m) of q, given the sampling
of some sensory data ~s and the generative model m entailed by
the agent.
The environmental quantities q may be any forces or fields
that act upon the agent, such as heat or light-stimulating sensory
receptors. In more complex agents, q may also refer to very
abstract quantities such as ‘social rank’ or ‘moral norms’. The
learning of the environmental quantities q and inferences about
their states rest on empirical Bayes and hierarchical generative
models [3,4]. In this framework, perceptual learning corresponds
to estimating the parameters m of the recognition density q(q; m)
after many sensations, whereas perceptual inference corresponds
to inferring the state of q after a single sensation. In a
hypothetical environment, learning could refer to the estimation
of the categories associated with sensations while inference would
be the classification of a particular sensation into one of these
categories. In what follows, we shall see how free-energy
minimization can account in a unified way for perception,
learning and action.
The divergence from the recognition density q(q; m) to the true
posterior density p(qD~s,m) is measured by the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence, which can be decomposed into two quantities
known as free-energy and surprise:
KL(q(q; m)DDp(qD~s,m))~Free-Energy{Surprise
~
ð
q
q(q; m) ln
q(q; m)
p(~s,qDm)
dqzln p(~sDm)
ð1Þ
The first term on the right side of the equation is the free-energy
that may be efficiently treated by adjusting the parameters m in
order to minimize the divergence. The second term is surprise,
which informs about the probability that some data ~s has been
generated under the assumptions of the model m. In Bayesian
model selection, the marginal likelihood p(~sDm) is also known as
the evidence for the model m. Rearranging (1), one obtains a
formulation of free-energy F (m,~s) in terms of divergence plus
surprise:
F (m,~s)~DivergencezSurprise~
KL(q(q; m)jjp(qj~s,m)){ln p(~sjm)
ð2Þ
The free-energy principle states that any adaptive agent that is at
equilibrium with its environment must minimize its free-energy
[1,2]. Minimizing free-energy with respect to m reduces diver-
gence, thereby making the recognition density q(q; m) an
approximate posterior density p(qD~s,m). Notice that divergence
depends on m while surprise does not. Because the divergence is
always non-negative (Gibb’s inequality), free-energy is said to be
an upper bound on surprise.
Crucially, biological agents can minimize free-energy not only
by changing their beliefs but also by changing their sensations
through acting on the environment. The dependency of sensation
~s on action a is expressed by ~s(a). A new rearrangement of (1)
shows more clearly what acting on the environment to minimize
free-energy F (m,a) implies (here, we replace the dependency of
free-energy on sensation ~s by expressing it directly as a function of
a):
Author Summary
Emotion plays a crucial role in the adaptation of humans
and other animals to changes in their world. Nevertheless,
emotion has been neglected in Bayesian models of
learning in non-stationary environments. The free-energy
principle has recently been proposed as a unified account
of learning, perception and action in biological agents. In
this paper, we propose a formal definition of emotional
valence (i.e., the positive and negative character of
emotion) in terms of the rate of change of free-energy
or, under some simplifying assumptions, of prediction
error over time. This formalization leads to a straightfor-
ward and simple meta-learning scheme that accounts for
the complex and reciprocal interaction between cognition
and emotion. We instantiate this scheme with an
emotional agent who is able to dynamically assign
emotional valence to every new state of the world that
is visited and to experience basic forms of emotion.
Crucially, our hypothetical agent uses emotional valence to
dynamically adapt to unexpected changes in the world.
The proposed scheme is very general in the sense that it is
not tied to any particular generative model of sensory
inputs.
Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle
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F (m,a)~Complexity{Accuracy~
KL(q(q; m)jjp(qjm)){Sln p(~s(a)jq,m)Tq
ð3Þ
where S:Tq means the expectation under the density q.
In this second formulation, free-energy is expressed as
complexity minus accuracy. Complexity is the divergence from
the recognition density q(q; m) to the true prior density p(qDm) of
the causes q. Accuracy is the surprise about sensations that are
expected under the recognition density; note that accuracy
depends on action a whereas complexity does not. This means
biological agents will act to minimise free-energy through
maximising accuracy. That is, biological agents will act in the
environment to sample sensations that are expected by their
recognition density.
This perspective on behaviour contrasts with the traditional one
in Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning, where behaviour is
chiefly understood in terms of maximizing expected reward or
pleasure (or conversely minimizing expected loss or pain) [25,26].
In active inference, behaviour is driven by an attempt to fulfil the
sensory expectations of posterior beliefs (recognition density). This
prevents the dichotomization of the states of the world in terms of
pairs of opposites, such as ‘reward-loss’ or ‘pleasure-pain’, and
implies that the notion of desired states is replaced with that of
expected states. States with high probability under the recognition
density (low surprise) are more frequently approached whereas
states with low probability (high surprise) are avoided by the agent.
Agents that expect to visit states that are noxious to their structure
will compromise their chances of survival and transmitting their
phenotype to future generations (e.g., a rabbit that expects to visit
foxes). The adaptive fitness of a phenotype is thus the negative
surprise averaged over all the states the agent visits [2].
Emotional valence
In order to harmonize the principled assumption that any
biological agent that is at equilibrium with its environment must
minimize its free-energy [2] and the traditional notion that
humans approach pleasure and avoid pain [27], we related
positive and negative valence to the decrease and increase of free-
energy over time, respectively. In a continuous time domain, the
rate of change of free-energy F (t) is the first time-derivative of
free-energy F ’(t) at time t. We thus formally define the valence of
a state visited by an agent at time t as the negative first time-
derivative of free-energy at that state or, simply, {F ’(t).
Here, we recall that adaptive agents encode a hierarchical
generative model of the causes of their sensations [3,4]. States of
the world of increasing complexity and abstraction are encoded in
higher levels of the hierarchy, whereas sensory data per se are
encoded at the lowest level. Free-energy is minimized for each
level of the hierarchy separately, and the quantity Fi(t)
corresponds to the free-energy associated with the hidden state
at the i-th level of the hierarchical model.
According to our definition of emotional valence, when Fi
0(t) is
positive (i.e., free-energy is increasing over time at level i of the
hierarchy) the valence of the state at this level i is negative at time
t. When Fi
0(t) is negative (i.e., free-energy is decreasing over time
at level i) the valence of the state at this level i is positive at time t.
When Fi
0(t) is zero (i.e., free-energy is constant at level i) the
valence of the state at this level i is neutral at time t. Importantly,
free-energy is an upper bound on surprise, and neutral valenced
states may also be characterized by low or high levels of surprise.
The factorization of emotional valence across levels of the
hierarchical model means that positive and negative valence can
be independently attributed to each state in the model, and thus
positive and negative valences can be concurrently elicited for the
same sensation. Note that free-energy and the rate of change of
free-energy are functions not just of current sensations but the
posterior beliefs about the causes of those sensations. This means
that the free-energy can change in a way that is context-sensitive,
depending upon (different) current beliefs about (exactly the same)
sensations.
Basic forms of emotion
Cognitive theories of emotion have widely relied on degrees of
belief about states of affairs (environmental states) for their
analyses of some basic forms of emotion. It has been suggested
that a large group of emotions, which includes happiness,
unhappiness, relief and disappointment, is related to certain (firm)
beliefs that states of affairs obtain, while a second smaller group of
emotions, mainly represented by hope and fear, is related to
uncertain beliefs [28–31]. These two classes of emotions have been
referred to as factive and epistemic, respectively [29]. In philosophy,
states of affairs are formally said to either obtain or not whereas
beliefs can be true or false (see [32]). Henceforth, we will adopt this
terminology.
To illustrate the difference between factive and epistemic emotions,
imagine the case of Lucia who is waiting for a train at the station.
Lucia is happy that the train is on time (state of affairs p), if she
desires p and is certain (i.e., firmly believes) that p obtains.
Conversely, Lucia is unhappy that p, if she does not desire p and is
certain that p obtains. However, Lucia hopes that p, if she desires p
but is uncertain that p obtains; and, alternatively, Lucia fears that p,
if she does not desire p but is uncertain that p obtains. On the
other hand, relief and disappointment are better related to the
transition from uncertain to certain beliefs [31]. For instance,
Lucia is relieved that not-p if she does not desire p and up to now was
uncertain about p, but now is certain that not-p obtains; conversely,
Lucia is disappointed that not-p if she desires p and up to now was
uncertain about p, but now is certain that not-p obtains.
Beliefs and desires can be intuitively related to bottom-up
conditional expectations and top-down predictions, respectively, in
a predictive coding scheme of free-energy minimization [2]. In this
formulation, states of affairs cannot be directly assessed but must
be inferred from sensory inputs. Assigning absolute certainty (or
zero uncertainty) to any belief impairs the learning of new
relationships between sensory inputs and their causes. Here, we
consider it more appropriate to circumvent the assumption of
certain beliefs proposed in cognitive theories of factive and
epistemic emotions, and present a new formulation that relies only
on the dynamics of free-energy without any explicit reference to
uncertainty. Later, we shall see that factive and epistemic emotions
are indeed associated with low and high levels of uncertainty,
respectively, but this comes as a consequence and not as a
necessary condition of their definition (see Results).
In a continuous time domain, the rate of change of the first
time-derivative of free-energy Fi
0(t) at the i-th level of the
hierarchical model is the second time-derivative of free-energy
F
00
i (t). By analogy with mechanical physics, Fi
0(t) and Fi 00(t) can be
understood as the velocity and acceleration of free-energy Fi(t) at
time t, respectively. Our proposal stands on the assumption that,
when both Fi
0(t) and Fi 00(t) are negative (i.e., free-energy Fi(t) is
decreasing ‘faster and faster’ over time) the agent hopes to be
visiting a state of lower free-energy in the near future at this level i.
However, when Fi
0(t) is negative and Fi 00(t) is positive (i.e., free-
energy is decreasing ‘slower and slower’ over time) the agent is
happy to be currently visiting a state of lower free-energy than the
previous one at this level i. Equivalently, when Fi
0(t) and Fi 00(t) are
Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle
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positive (i.e., free-energy is increasing ‘faster and faster’ over time)
the agent fears to be visiting a state of greater free-energy in the
near future at this level i. However, when Fi
0(t) is positive and
Fi
00(t) is negative (i.e., free-energy is increasing ‘slower and slower’
over time) the agent is unhappy to be currently visiting a state of
higher free-energy than the previous one at this level i.
Additionally, when the rate of change of free-energy Fi
0(t) changes
sign from negative to positive, the agent is disappointed not to be
visiting a state of lower free-energy than the current one at this
level i. Conversely, when Fi
0(t) changes sign from positive to
negative, the agent is relieved not to be visiting a state of higher free-
energy than the current one at this level i. Finally, when Fi
0(t) and
Fi
00(t) are zero (i.e., free-energy is constant over time) the agent
may be low or high neutrally surprised in this level i. This analysis is
summarized in Table 1. Note that since free-energy is minimized
for each level of the hierarchical model separately, our formulation
also predicts that different emotions can occur concurrently.
The dynamics of free-energy reveal an interesting temporal
dependency among the basic forms of emotion. Figure 1 illustrates
two hypothetical dynamics of free-energy (top and bottom rows)
that elicit distinct patterns of emotion over time (left column).
From the two-dimensional space defined by the first and second
time-derivatives of free-energy (right column), it becomes clear
that transitions from negative to positive emotions can only occur
by passing through relief, and transitions from positive to negative
emotions can only occur by passing through disappointment, but
transitions between negative (e.g., fear and unhappiness) or positive
(e.g., hope and happiness) emotions can occur bidirectionally. More
importantly, each basic form of emotion is mapped onto a
particular region of this two-dimensional space.
Emotional regulation of estimation uncertainty
So far, we have described how emotional valence and some
basic forms of emotion can be elicited by the dynamics of free-
energy. What, however, is the function of these quantities in a
scheme originally developed to explain perception, learning and
action? We propose that valence, computed as the negative rate of
change of free-energy, is crucial because it informs biological
agents about unexpected changes in their world. When valence is
positive, sensory inputs fulfil the agent’s expectations and the
probability of unexpected changes is low. However, when valence
is negative, the agent’s expectations are violated and unexpected
changes in the world are likely to have taken place. In settings
where recent information is a better predictor of states of the world
than past information, that is, in a changing world, recent
information must be more heavily weighted and, therefore, the
learning rate should be high [14]. Conversely, in a stationary
world, in which past and recent information are equally
informative, the learning rate should be low in order to take into
account both past and recent information.
We formalise this notion in terms of emotional meta-learning in
which estimation uncertainty is determined not just by free-energy
but by the rate of change of free-energy. More specifically, when
the free-energy associated with posterior beliefs about states at a
particular level in the agent’s hierarchical model is increasing, the
posterior certainty about these states decreases. In other words, the
agent interprets decreasing evidence for its estimates of states of
the world as evidence that it is too confident about those states.
This can be implemented fairly simply with the augmented
Bayesian update:
ln s^i(t)~lnsi(t)zlF ’i(t){t ð4Þ
si(t)~ arg min
si
Fi ð5Þ
Fi(t)~{
ð
q xi{1,xið Þln p xi{1,xið Þ{S q xið Þð Þ ð6Þ
Here, the variances s^i(t) and si(t) correspond to the posterior
estimation uncertainty with and without emotional regulation,
respectively. The variance si(t) is the one that changes to
minimize the free-energy Fi(t) at the i-th level of the generative
model. The quantity S(:) denotes the Shannon entropy, which in
this case is a measure of the uncertainty associated with the states
at level i in the recognition density. The parameter l can be
interpreted as the sensitiveness or ‘awareness’ of the agent to its
emotional valence signals, which informs the agent about changes
in the world. The parameter t represents a long-lasting valenced
level that lacks a clear referent, which we thus interpret as mood
[23]. The parameters l and t are both state and agent dependent.
They can also be interpreted as the agent’s meta-cognition about
the extent to which the agent knows that it does not know the
structure of the world.
We have framed the emotional regulation of uncertainty as
meta-learning to emphasise that learning (the update) is informed
by the consequences of learning, here, the rate of change of
variational free-energy. Note that this is a very general scheme that
is not tied to any particular generative model. Crucially,
expectations about various states, which define them as surprising
or not, rest upon prior beliefs that are themselves optimised with
respect to variational free-energy; either at an evolutionary
timescale or during experience dependent learning.
From equation 4, one can see that positive and negative valence
exponentially decreases and increases, respectively, the estimation
uncertainty about states of the world. The mood t induces a
constant level of over or under-confidence in the estimates of states
irrespective of how surprising the sensory inputs may be. In a
negative mood (tv0), the agent overweights recent inputs,
tracking more easily any volatility in the environment. In a
positive mood (tw0), the agent overweight past inputs, becoming
more attached to past information and less susceptible to tracking
environmental changes.
Table 1. Basic forms of emotion and the dynamics of free-
energy.
Emotion
at time t Valence
Factive/
Epistemic F ’(t)a F ’’(t)b
happy(t) positive factive v0 w0
unhappy(t) negative factive w0 v0
hopes(t) positive epistemic v0 v0
fears(t) negative epistemic w0 w0
surprised(t) neutral factive 0 0
relieved(t) positive factive {0c v0
disappointed(t) negative factive z0d w0
aFirst time-derivative of free-energy at time t.
bSecond time-derivative of free-energy at time t.
cNegative value very close to zero.
dPositive value very close to zero.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.t001
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This emotionally regularized update scheme may appear a bit
ad hoc. However, there are several important heuristics in the
optimisation literature that are closely related to Equation 4.
These are generally described as regularization schemes - for
example Levenberg Marquardt Regularization - in which the
gradient descent or learning rate is generally decreased when the
objective function being optimized does not change as expected.
Usually, this regularization can be cast as changing the relative
precision of the data at hand. In short, like our scheme,
regularization schemes detect a failure in optimization in terms
of adverse changes in the objective function (here the free energy)
and respond by making more cautious updates - through changing
the expected uncertainty about data or prior beliefs. We will see
later that, in a hierarchical setting, this can lead to an adaptive
change in the rate of optimization or learning at various levels of a
hierarchical model.
Results
In this section, we apply equation 4 to demonstrate how one can
simulate an emotional agent. In brief, we will compare and
contrast two schemes that are exposed to exactly the same sensory
inputs and do or do not have emotional updates. The first is based
on a hierarchical Bayesian treatment of volatility models that
explicitly optimises posterior beliefs about estimation uncertainty.
The second uses a simpler generative model that does not optimise
the estimates of uncertainty explicitly but implements valence.
Using this simpler scheme we show that the same adaptive
behaviour can be reproduced using the emotional updates above.
The dynamic perceptual model
Mathys et al. [10] have proposed a generic hierarchical
Bayesian scheme that accounts for learning under multiple forms
of uncertainty and environmental states. The environmental states
can be either discrete or continuous, and the uncertainty can range
from probabilistic relations between environmental and perceptual
states (perceptual ambiguity) to environmental volatility. Here, we
focus only on the simplest discrete and deterministic (i.e., without
perceptual ambiguity) environment which nevertheless includes
volatility.
In our example of a discrete and deterministic environment, we
simulate an agent that learns the probability of a slot machine
(one-armed bandit) to generate outcomes (x1) equal to either $1
(x1~1) or $0 (x1~0). The agent’s sensations (u) of the outcomes
(x1) are unambiguous, meaning that u~x1 for both x1~1 and
x1~0. The reward probability of the slot machine is governed by
the tendency (x2) of the machine to generate $1. In the dynamic
perceptual model, the agent knows that the reward tendency may
change over time and therefore they also estimate its volatility (x3).
This discrete and deterministic environment can be formalized
with the statement that the sensory input u(k)[f0,1g is binary and
the environmental state x
(k)
1 [f0,1g is the deterministic cause of
input u(k) at trial k. The likelihood of state x1 given sensory input u
has the following form (for simplicity, we omit the trial reference
k):
p uDx1ð Þ~ uð Þx1 1{uð Þ1{x1 ð7Þ
Therefore, u~x1 for both x1~1 and x1~0. At the next level of
the hierarchy, the tendency of x1~1 (i.e., outcome equal to $1) is
defined by the state x
(k)
2 [<. The probability of x1~1 approaches
zero when x2?{? and approaches one when x2??. The
mapping from the tendency x2 to the probability of x1 is defined
Figure 1. Basic forms of emotion and the dynamics of free-energy. (top and bottom rows) Two hypothetical dynamics of free-energy and
their corresponding basic forms of emotion. (left column) Free-energy F plotted as a function of time. (middle column) The same free-energy F and
its first time-derivative F ’ (valence) as a function of time. (right column) The first F ’ and second F ’’ time-derivatives of the same trajectory of free-
energy F as a function of time. Notice that the basic forms of emotion are mapped to specific quadrants in the first and second time-derivative
spaces independently of the free-energy trajectory. The black arrows indicate the direction of increasing time. The background colours identify the
basic forms of emotion elicited at each time point: happiness (dark blue), unhappiness (dark red), hope (light blue), fear (light red), relief (transition
from dark red to light blue), disappointment (transition from dark blue to light red) and surprise (grey).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.g001
Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 5 June 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e1003094
by the following empirical (conditional) prior density:
p x1Dx2ð Þ~s x2ð Þx1 1{s x2ð Þð Þ1{x1~Bernoulli x1; s x2ð Þð Þ ð8Þ
where s(:) is the sigmoid function:
s(x)~
def 1
1zexp({x)
ð9Þ
It is also assumed that the state x
(k)
2 at trial k is normally
distributed around its value at the previous trial x
(k{1)
2 with
variance exp(kx
(k)
3 zv). In other words, x2 evolves in time as a
Gaussian random walk:
p x
(k)
2 Dx
(k{1)
2 ,x
(k)
3
 
~N x(k)2 ; x(k{1)2 ,exp(kx(k)3 zv)
 
ð10Þ
where the parameters k and v are agent dependent.
The state x
(k)
3 determines the log-volatility of the environment
and is represented at the third level of the model. Again, x3 also
evolves in time as a Gaussian random walk but with a step size
defined by the constant q that may also differ among agents:
p x
(k)
3 Dx
(k{1)
3 ,q
 
~N x(k)3 ; x(k{1)3 ,q
 
ð11Þ
This structure defines a four-level generative model, where q is
represented at the last level, and its inversion corresponds to
optimizing the posterior densities over unknown hidden states
x~fx1,x2,x3g and parameters x~fk,v,qg. Here, states and
parameters are distinguished in terms of the timescale at which
they change. More specifically, states change quickly and
parameters change either slowly or not at all for the duration of
the observations.
The static perceptual model with emotional valence
Alternatively, we propose a generative model that does not
explicitly estimate the volatility (e.g., x3) of some environmental
states (e.g., x2) but instead makes use of emotional valence (i.e., the
negative rate of change of free-energy over time) to assess
unexpected changes in the environment. For that purpose, we
implement the static perceptual model proposed by Daunizeau et
al. [15] with two modifications. First, we consider unambiguous
sensory inputs as in Mathys et al. [10] and, second, we use valence
to update the posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) of states
according to equation 4.
At the first level of the hierarchy, the dynamic model and static
perceptual model with valence are exactly the same. At the second
level, the static model assumes that the tendency x2 of outcome x1
to be equal to $1 is constant across trials:
x
(k)
2 ~x
(0)
2 : Vk ð12Þ
After inverting this generative model using variational free-energy
minimization as described in [10,15], we obtain the updated
equations of the posterior distribution of x
(k)
i , which can be used to
investigate the behaviour of the agent on a trial-by-trial basis:
m(k)1 ~u
(k) ð13Þ
s
(k)
2 ~
1
1=s^(k)2 zs^
(k)
1
ð14Þ
m(k)2 ~m
(k{1)
2 zs
(k)
2 d
(k)
1 ð15Þ
where the following definitions have been used:
m^(k)1 ~
def
s(m(k{1)2 ) ð16Þ
d(k)1 ~
def
m(k)1 {m^
(k)
1 ð17Þ
s^(k)1 ~
def
m^(k{1)1 1{m^
(k{1)
1
 
ð18Þ
s^(k)2 ~
def
s(k{1)2 e
l+F (k{1)
2
{t ð19Þ
Here, m
(k)
1 and m
(k)
2 are the posterior expectations of x1 and x2 after
sensory input u(k), which can be interpreted as the expected
probability and the expected tendency of reward, respectively.
Accordingly, the uncertainty s(k)2 is the posterior variance of x2.
The prediction error at the first level d(k)1 is the difference between
the expectation m
(k)
1 and the prediction m^
(k)
1 before seeing the input
u(k). Equivalently, s^(k)1 is the variance of the prediction m^
(k)
1 before
seeing the input u(k).
In order to adapt to unexpected changes in the environment,
the agent needs to update the posterior variance s
(k)
2 proportion-
ally to the valence of the state x2 at time k{1. In discrete time, the
valence of the state x
(k)
i is, by definition, the negative first
backward difference of free-energy +F (k)i at time k:
+F (k)i ~
def
F
(k)
i {F
(k{1)
i ð20Þ
Specific to the proposed generative model, the free-energy F
(k)
2
of state x
(k)
2 is:
F
(k)
2 ~{E ln p x
(k)
1 Dx
(k)
2
 
zln p x
(k)
2
 h i
{S q x
(k)
2
  
~{m(k)2 m
(k)
1 {1
 
{ln s m(k)2
 
{
1
2
s m(k)2
 2
{s m(k)2
  
s(k)2
z
1
2s^
(k)
2
m(k)2 {m
(k{1)
2
 
zs(k)2
 
z
1
2
ln s^(k)2 z
1
2
ln 2p
{
1
2
lns(k)2 {
1
2
ln 2pe
ð21Þ
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where the expectation is taken under the approximate posterior
densities q x
(k)
1
 
and q x
(k)
2
 
.
The parameters l and t are constant and dependent on the
agent. They represent the sensitiveness to emotional valence and
the mood of the agent, respectively. According to our assumptions,
the uncertainty of a hidden state xi should increase or decrease
when its valence {+F (k)i is negative or positive, respectively.
Therefore, l is constrained within the interval 0,?½ . Notice that,
when l and t are equal to zero, the static perceptual model with
valence becomes the same as the standard static perceptual model
described in [15].
The reference scenario
Having defined the two competing schemes, we implemented
two agents under the dynamic perceptual model (DP) and the
static perceptual model with valence (SPV), hereafter referred to as
the DP agent and the SPV agent. These agents were exposed to
320 sensory inputs (outcomes) sampled from a three-stage
reference scenario as proposed in [10]. In the first stage (low
volatility) of the scenario, the agents were exposed to a sequence of
100 outcomes where the probability of x1~1 (outcome equal to
$1) was 0.5. In the second stage (high volatility), the probability
that x1~1 alternated between 0.9 and 0.1 every 20 inputs. Finally,
in the third stage (low volatility again), the first 100 outcomes were
repeated in exactly the same order. The initial values of the hidden
states x2 and x1 were m
(0)
2 ~0, s
(0)
2 ~1 and m
(0)
1 ~s(m
(0)
2 ) for both
the DP and SPV models. In the DP model, the initial values of the
hidden state x3 were m
(0)
3 ~{0:4 and s
(0)
3 ~1.
We replicated the results reported by Mathys et al. [10] for the
DP model with the same parameters q~0:5, v~{2:2 and
k~1:4 (see Figure 2). Overall, the posterior expectation of x1,
which is the reward probability, fluctuated around the true
probability of x1~1 both in the low and high volatility stages.
Nevertheless, one can observe increasing instability during the
third stage relative to the first, even though the inputs were
presented exactly in the same order in both of them. Mathys et al.
[10] explained this in terms of a strong tendency for the agent to
increase its posterior expectation of log-volatility m3 in response to
surprising stimuli (given the parameters used in the reference
scenario). The increase of m3 was followed by an increase in the
posterior variance s2 of state x2, which regulates the learning rate
at the second level. Despite the different levels of volatility in each
stage, the posterior variance s2 smoothly increased with a constant
rate during the whole scenario.
We first evaluated the SPV model setting both the sensitiveness
l and mood t equal to zero. In this case, the agent learns
according to a standard static perceptual model and is completely
insensitive to any volatility or unexpected change in the
environment. As illustrated in Figure 3, the posterior expectation
of x1~1 converges to 0.5, which is the true probability of x1~1
across the three (low and high volatility) stages. Concomitantly, the
posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) s2 asymptotically
decreases toward zero, reflecting the decreasing uncertainty of
the estimates across sensory inputs.
When setting the parameters l and t to values different than
zero, the agent becomes sensitive to changes in its environment. In
Figure 4, one can observe the effect of mood t alone. When t is set
to 20.13 and l is kept equal to 0, a negative mood is sufficient to
make the SPV model reactive to the volatility of the environment
similar to the DP model. Importantly, the dynamic model also has
a constant parameter v that is agent dependent, which has a
similar function to t in our model. Nevertheless, the SPV does not
show the increasing instability in the last (low volatility) stage
observed in the DP model. In fact, the posterior variance s2
returns to a stable baseline even after the increased fluctuation
during the high volatility stage.
With the addition of emotional valence to the model, the
agent becomes even more reactive and is able to track fast
changes in the environment. In Figure 5, the sensitiveness l is
set to 0.8. The posterior variance s2 now changes more quickly
in response to surprising sensory inputs and there is a clear
distinction between the low and high volatility stages. More
specifically, the elicitation of negative valence is the main cause
of increases in s2, whereas positive valence causes s2 to
decrease. Despite the phasic reaction to unexpected changes
during the high volatility stage, the agent returns again to a
fairly stable baseline similar to the first low volatility stage in the
last low volatility stage.
Critically, an optimal tracking of environmental volatility
requires mood to be set to some appropriate negative value. An
extremely low mood, characterized by a large negative tau, would
cause a very large increase in estimation uncertainty, conse-
quently impairing discrimination between high and low volatility
stages.
Uncertainty associated with factive and epistemic
emotions
We also investigated the estimation uncertainty associated with
the factive (happiness or unhappiness) and epistemic (fear or hope)
emotions in the reference scenario. It is noteworthy that we
defined these emotions simply in terms of the dynamics of free-
energy without any assumptions about uncertainty, contrary to the
traditional analysis of these emotions in psychology and philoso-
phy (see [28–31]). For this purpose, we performed 100 realizations
of the reference scenario (i.e., we repeated the simulation with the
reference scenario 100 times, sampling new sensory inputs at each
time) and we computed the mean of the posterior variance
(estimation uncertainty) s^2 of state x2 immediately after the onset
of factive and epistemic emotions. The posterior variance s^2
represents the change in estimation uncertainty after the elicitation
of the emotion and before the observation of the next sensory
input (see equation 19). For this analysis, we set the sensitiveness l
to an intermediate value equal to 0.4 and we kept the mood t
equal to 20.13.
The distribution of the mean s^2 across simulations grouped
within the low and high volatility stages of the reference scenario is
shown in Figure 6. In both the low and high volatility stages, the
mean s^2 was higher on average for the epistemic (low volatility:
M=0.68, SD=0.03; high volatility: M=1.07, SD=0.19) than the
factive (low volatility: M=0.58, SD=0.02; high volatility:
M=0.69, SD=0.06) emotions. Furthermore, the mean s^2 was
also higher on average during the high (M=0.88, SD=0.24) than
the low volatility (M=0.63, SD=0.06) stages.
Discussion
In this paper, we have proposed a biologically plausible
computational model of emotional valence inspired by the free-
energy principle. The mathematical definition of emotional
valence in terms of the negative rate of change of free-energy
not only accounts for how beliefs determine emotions but also
provides a formal account of how emotions determine the content
and the degree of posterior beliefs (see [19]). In our framework
emotional valence regulates estimation uncertainty signalling
unexpected changes in the world, thereby performing an
important meta-learning function.
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The relationship between emotional valence and state transition
also finds support in previous studies of emotion (see [33–36]). Batson
et al. [35] have argued that the shift from a less valued state (i.e., high
free-energy) to a more valued state (i.e., low free-energy) is
accompanied by positive affect, while a shift in the opposite direction
is accompanied by negative affect. Likewise, Ben-Zeev [36] has
suggested that emotions are generated when the level of stimulation
we have experienced for long enough to get accustomed to it changes,
and the change, rather than the general level, is of emotional
significance. Accordingly, in the words of the same author, ‘‘loss of
satisfaction does not produce a neutral state, but misery, and loss of
misery does not produce a neutral state either, but happiness’’ [36].
Similar situations can also be found when people are
entertained by magicians or humorists. In both cases, following
the surprise elicited by the apparent violation of the physical laws
in magic [37] or the incongruity of the situation in humour [38],
greatest pleasure is experienced when the trick or the joke is
understood. Our suggestion is that pleasure is elicited in the
transition from a state of high to low surprise. Critically, magic
tricks are performed on a stage where people know that there is no
real violation of the physical laws; if such surprising events would
happen in everyday life, they would probably be experienced as
quite disturbing and unpleasant.
According to our scheme, emotional valence is not estimated
itself by the agent but emerges naturally from the process of
estimating hidden states by means of free-energy minimization.
One could eventually hypothesize that some living organisms, such
as humans, explicitly represent valence as one of the causes of their
sensations. This means that these agents should also estimate
valence (and its uncertainty) like any other hidden state in their
generative model. Nevertheless, the explicit representation of
valence is not a requirement for emotional valence to exist in our
scheme and to play an important role in the adaptation of
biological agents to unexpected changes in their world.
To put our valence-based meta-learning scheme to a test, we
compared two competing agents in a non-stationary environment.
The SPV agent with valence replicated the behaviour of the DP
agent that explicitly estimated the volatility of the environment
[10]. Nevertheless, the adaptive fitness of the SPV agent to
unexpected changes was achieved with the representation of only
two hidden states x~fx1,x2g and two parameters x~ft,lg,
whereas the DP agent required three hidden states x~fx1,x2,x3g
and three parameters x~fk,v,qg. More importantly, the two
parameters l and t of the SPV agent have a clear psychological
interpretation in terms of sensitiveness to emotional valence and
mood, respectively. The mood t was shown to be important for
Figure 2. Dynamic perceptual model: q~0:5, v~{2:2 and k~1:4. A simulation of 320 trials. The first (low volatility), second (high volatility)
and third (low volatility) stages are separated by vertical dashed lines. (top) The agent’s posterior expectation s(m2) that x1~1 (red line) after sensory
input u (green dots), is plotted over the true probability that x1~1 (black line), which is unknown to the agent. (bottom left) The time course of the
posterior variance s2 of x2 over trials. The size of the black circles is proportional to the surprise of sensory input u at trial k. (bottom right) The
change in the posterior variance of x2 from trial k{1 to trial k as a function of the surprise of sensory input u at trial k.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.g002
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tracking slow and continuous changes in the environment, known
as volatility, whereas the sensitiveness l was shown to be crucial for
tracking fast and discrete changes, known as unexpected
uncertainty. The proposed scheme is very general and does not
rely on any particular generative model of how sensory inputs are
caused, meaning that it can account for any internal model of the
world that defines a particular agent (see [7]).
We also investigated the relationship between estimation
uncertainty and factive (happiness as well as unhappiness) and epistemic
(hope and fear) emotions. Although psychologists and philosophers
have traditionally relied on degrees of belief (uncertainty) in their
analyses of these families of emotion [28–31], we alternatively
relied only on the dynamics of free-energy. In agreement with
these more traditional analyses, we found that epistemic emotions
are indeed more related to higher levels of (estimation) uncertainty
than factive emotions. However, at the algorithmic level, we
reiterate our claim that the computational quantity that unam-
biguously distinguishes between factive and epistemic emotions is not
degrees of belief, as previously proposed [31], but rather the
temporal dynamics of free-energy.
More important for psychological perspectives on emotion, the
trajectory invariant representation of emotions in the state space
defined by the first and second time-derivatives of free-energy
also recapitulates the dimensional view of emotion [39]. Although
the first time-derivative of free-energy F ’(t) has been intuitively
related to the dimension of valence, it is still unclear how to
interpret the second time-derivative F ’’(t) in terms of a
psychological construct. The emergence of some forms of
emotion, tentatively labelled as happiness, unhappiness, hope, fear,
disappointment and relief, also provides support for the notion of
basic emotions [40], in the sense that these emotions are
exclusively related to very precise dynamics of free-energy.
Furthermore, our scheme also encompasses important aspects of
cognitive models of emotion [31,41,42], in the sense that states of
the world (e.g., agents, objects, events), which are relevant for the
diversity and complexity of human emotions, can be accounted
for within the hierarchical generative model entailed by the
agent. To illustrate, happiness (unhappiness) has been related to
the negative (positive) first time-derivative and the positive
(negative) second time-derivative of the free-energy of some state
in the generative model. When the state under consideration is
the fate of another person, this can be understood as a specific
form of happiness (unhappiness) usually known as ‘joy for
another’ (pity) [31].
Figure 3. Static perceptual model: l~0 and t~0. The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference
scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). (top) The posterior expectation of x1~1 converges to 0.5, which is the true probability of x1~1 across the three
(low and high volatility) stages. The agent is unaware of unexpected changes in the environment. (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation
uncertainty) s2 of x2 asymptotically converges to zero across trials k. Negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences are indicated when
elicited over the trial. The size of the circles is proportional to the surprise of the sensory input u at trial k. (bottom right) The change in the posterior
variance of x2 from trial k to trial kz1 as a function of negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.g003
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The concept of value has been largely related to valence in
social and affective psychology (see [43]). Our definition of
emotional valence in terms of the rate of change of free-energy also
provides a formal distinction between valence and value. In the
free-energy principle, value is the complement of free-energy in
the sense that minimizing free-energy corresponds to maximizing
the probability that an agent will visit valuable states, where the
evolutionary value of a phenotype is the negative surprise averaged
over all the (interoceptive and exteroceptive) sensory states it
experiences [2]. This formulation parallels a recently proposed
reinforcement learning theory for homeostatic regulation [44],
which attempts to integrate reward (valence) maximization with
the minimization of departures from homeostasis (free-energy).
Our scheme is also broadly compatible with the predictive
coding model of conscious presence [45], which claims that
interoceptive inference is the constitutive basis of the subjective
experience of emotions. Although our formulation treats interoceptive
and exteroceptive predictions (and their uncertainty) on an equal
footing, one might imagine that prediction of interoceptive states
would be a particularly important target for emotional regulation.
This is because, from an evolutionary perspective, it is important
to maintain a physiological homeostasis and respond adaptively to
any unpredicted changes in the internal milieu. Furthermore, the
putative emphasis on interoception provides a close link between
(literally) ‘gut feelings’ and the computational (inferential) role of
emotion that we have described above.
An apparent paradox that might emerge from our definition of
emotional valence is related to the common sense notion that both
the violation and the fulfilment of expectations can be either
positive or negative. As we stated before, according to our scheme,
the fulfilment of expectations must always elicit positive emotions
whereas the violation of expectations must always elicit negative
emotions. Therefore, how can the subjective experience of positive
surprises and negative expectations be accounted for within our scheme?
In our perspective, these experiences emerge from a confound
between the fulfilment and the violation of expectations across
different levels of the hierarchical generative model. To illustrate
this, we first need to recall that in the Bayesian brain formulation,
agents encode a hierarchical generative model of the causes of
their sensations, where states of the world of increasing complexity
and abstraction are encoded in higher levels of the hierarchy and
sensory data per se are encoded at the lowest level. Let us imagine
the case of an old friend who suddenly steps in our door. This
unexpected visit can be intuitively related to the experience of a
Figure 4. Static perceptual model with valence: l~0 and t~{0:13. The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described
in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). Now, the agent becomes reactive to unexpected changes in the environment. (top) The posterior
expectation of x1~1 fluctuates around the true probability of x1~1 at each stage in a manner similar to the dynamic perceptual model (see Figure 2).
(bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) s2 maintains a constant baseline during the first and third (low volatility) stages mainly
defined by the mood, but starts to show a tendency to fluctuate more freely during the second (high volatility) stage. (bottom right) The change in
the posterior variance of x2 from trial k to trial kz1 as a function of negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences is quite similar to the
standard static model (see Figure 3), except for a small offset defined by the mood.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.g004
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very positive and surprising emotion. However, a more careful
analysis can unveil which aspects of this experience are indeed
surprising and which are just as expected, given a hierarchical
generative model of how sensations are caused. Assuming that our
friend has moved to a distant city many years ago, the sudden
apparition of this friend certainly violates any expectation about
the physical causes of sensations. It would be very surprising to
meet a friend at our door when they are expected to be miles away
- no matter how beloved they might be. Such a surprising
sensation should elicit unpleasantness at the corresponding levels
of the model where physical causes of sensations are encoded.
Concomitantly, this same sensation should also fulfil more abstract
expectations that we might have of being close to beloved ones.
The fulfilment of these expectations should conversely elicit
pleasantness at higher levels of the generative model where these
more abstract causes of sensations are probably represented. With
the formalism of a hierarchical generative model, the causes of
sensations can be clearly defined and their respective valence
properly investigated. In the example above, we would thus
consider it more precise to say that ‘we are surprised about the
unexpected visit of a friend but happy to be close to a beloved
one’. Here, our explanation rests upon the assumption that the
subjective experience of emotion usually confounds the increasing
fulfilment (pleasantness) and violation (unpleasantness) of expec-
tations across different levels of the hierarchical model.
In another example, the reasoning above also can help us to
explain how our scheme may account for sensations that are
expected but of negative valence (e.g., the expectation of an
eminent injury). Let us imagine the case of someone who is
walking on the street and suddenly sees a cyclist riding a bicycle
dangerously. As the cyclist gets closer, the person becomes
increasingly confident that they will be hit by the bicycle. In this
situation, the movement of the bicycle fulfils the expectations of
the person about how physical bodies should move in the world
and, therefore, it elicits pleasantness at those levels of the
generative model. Indeed, it would be very surprising (and
unpleasant at these levels) if the bicycle suddenly disappeared or
made an unexpected movement that violated the physical laws of
motion. Nevertheless, the approach of the bicycle also violates
other expectations regarding the safety of walking down the street,
which are probably represented at different levels of the
hierarchical model. At these levels, the approach of the bicycle
Figure 5. Static perceptual model with valence: l~0:8 and t~{0:13. The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described
in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). Now, the agent becomes extremely reactive to unexpected changes in the environment. (top)
The posterior expectation of x1~1 changes more quickly and is closer to the true probability of x1~1 at each stage. (bottom left) The posterior
variance (estimation uncertainty) s2 maintains a constant baseline during the first and third (low volatility) stages mainly defined by the mood, but it
fluctuates more widely during the second (high volatility) stage. This clarifies the distinction between the low and high volatility stages. Negative (red
circle) and positive (blue circle) valences are clearly associated with increases and decreases in uncertainty, respectively, and they become more
intense during the second (high volatility) stage. (bottom right) The posterior variance of x2 from trial k to trial kz1 increases after negative valence
but decreases after positive valence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.g005
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is very unpleasant and becomes even more unpleasant when the
person is indeed injured by the bicycle. Again, in this case, we
would consider more precise to say that ‘the person expects the
bicycle to hit them - under such environmental conditions - but
they do not expect to be injured when walking down the street’.
The flexibility of our scheme to accommodate different
generative models may raise some concerns regarding the
falsifiability of our theory. However, we would like to clarify that
hypotheses derived from our theory should be tested conditional
on a particular generative model. Especially given the known
diversity of phenotypes in nature, we consider that this flexibility is
more a strength than a weakness. Furthermore, generative
hierarchical models and free-energy minimization provide a
principled way to represent the relationship between hidden states
and to understand their dynamics. Nevertheless, further empirical
work is still required to better understand at which levels of the
hierarchical generative model the violation of expectations might
be more closely related to the subjective experience of surprise and
emotional valence. Our intuition is that the subjective experience of
surprise is more closely related to violations at lower levels of the
hierarchy, whereas the subjective experience of emotional valence is more
closely related to violations at higher levels.
The distinction between violation and fulfilment of expectations
across different levels of the generative model might also help us to
further disambiguate the subjective experience of other emotions such
as fear and anxiety, which have an important role in psychopathol-
ogy. One of the ways in which cognitive theories of emotion have
distinguished fear from anxiety is based on the physical and
existential aspect of their causes. Fear involves threats that are
concrete and sudden, whereas anxiety is related to threats that are
more symbolic, existential and ephemeral [41,42]. Nevertheless,
both fear and anxiety are related to the prospect of visiting
unpleasant states in the future, which in our scheme has been
related to a ‘faster and faster’ increase of free-energy over time. To
illustrate, let us imagine the case of a spider-phobic person who is
presented with a spider. The subjective experience of fear in this case
could be explained as the product of (1) a ‘slower and slower’
increase in the violation of the expectations about the more
physical causes of sensations, which encodes the physical
recognition of the spider, eliciting unhappiness at these levels;
and (2) a ‘faster and faster’ increase in the violation of the
expectations about more abstract causes of sensations, such as the
increasing probability of being bitten by the spider, eliciting fear at
these levels. However, in the case of anxiety, there seems to be
incongruence between the violation of expectations about the
physical and the existential causes of sensations. Therefore, in our
perspective, the subjective experience of anxiety should be expressed as
the product of (1) a stationary violation of the expectations about
the physical causes of sensations (i.e., the environment is physically
perceived as usual) bringing neutrality to these levels, and (2) a
‘faster and faster’ increase in the violation of the expectations
about more abstract/existential causes of sensations, eliciting fear
at these levels. This incongruence of violation across levels of the
generative model could explain the difficulty that anxious people
have to attribute concrete causes to their fears.
Our formulation of emotional valence might also be of
importance in the investigation of affective and other mental
disorders, such as depressive and anxiety disorders [46]. For
instance, when we use our model to explain major depressive
disorder (MDD), which is a complex debilitating psychiatric
condition that is largely characterized by persistent low mood and
decreased interest or pleasure in usually enjoyable activities [47],
we immediately find the crucial role played by our mood model
parameter t. In our meta-learning scheme, when mood is low
(tv0), the estimation uncertainty of environmental states is
overestimated and top-down predictions become under confident.
Figure 6. Boxplots of the mean posterior variance s^2 of state x2 after the elicitation of factive (happiness or unhappiness) and
epistemic (fear or hope) emotions and before the observation of the next sensory input. (left) Mean posterior variance s^2 during the low
volatility stages of the reference scenario. (right) Mean posterior variance s^2 during the high volatility stages of the reference scenario. The mean s^2
was computed for each of 100 simulations of the reference scenario. In both the low and high volatility stages, the mean s^2 was on average higher
for the epistemic (low volatility: M= 0.68, SD=0.03; high volatility: M=1.07, SD= 0.19) than the factive (low volatility: M=0.58, SD= 0.02; high
volatility: M= 0.69, SD= 0.06) emotions and it was also on average higher during the high (M=0.88, SD= 0.24) than the low volatility (M= 0.63,
SD=0.06) stages.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094.g006
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Theoretical computational simulations has shown that patholog-
ical under confidence in top-down predictions can impair
behaviour due to a failure in eliciting sufficient sensory prediction
errors [48]. Consequently, the agent reacts less vigorously toward,
or away from stimuli that might have been previously evaluated as
pleasant or unpleasant. In fact, several studies have reported that
clinically depressed individuals spend significantly more time
looking at negative stimuli [49–52]. A subsequent, and cyclical,
increase in mood (tw0) could eventually explain manic episodes
in bipolar disorders [53]. Manic episodes are characterized by a
distinct period during which patients experience abnormally and
persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood [54]. In fact, a
pathological increase in the precision of top-down predictions has
also been shown to induce perseverative behaviours [48]. It would
be interesting to investigate how mood induction in healthy
subjects might affect their performance on tasks where tracking
volatility is necessary. According to our theory, we would predict
that subjects with mood levels below and above the optimum for
tracking some particular level of environmental volatility should
benefit from positive and negative mood induction, respectively.
More precisely, an inverted U-shaped performance curve is
predicted with depressed and manic patients found at the lowest
and highest extremes of the mood range.
A reasonable approach to test hypotheses derived from our
theory would be to invert a generative model (i.e., estimate the
unknown model parameters) for the experimental task at hand
using variational Bayes [55]. The free-energy computed during
this inversion process can then be exploited to estimate the
emotions at different levels of the hierarchical generative model
according to our scheme. A complete characterization of the
generative model could eventually be relaxed if a direct measure of
the free-energy or, under simplifying assumptions, prediction error
is also available. Indeed, the quantity that matters for testing our
emotional valence hypothesis is the rate of change of free-energy
rather than the generative model itself.
Future empirical work should investigate the correlation
between the estimated emotional valence (i.e., the first time-
derivative of free-energy) and verbal-reports of valence for a
variety of experimental conditions. As previously mentioned, free-
energy is an upper bound on surprise and its minimization also
entails prediction error reduction. In this perspective, recording
prediction error signals in the brain, computing their temporal
derivatives and correlating them to verbal-reports of valence could
be a suitable procedure. Human neuroimaging studies have shown
that the orbitofrontal cortex plays an important role in linking
different types of reward to hedonic experience (see [56]).
Orchestrated with the striatum [57], which has been traditionally
implicated in reward prediction error [58] and saliency [59], those
two regions might be of particular relevance to the investigation of
our scheme in the brain. In biologically plausible implementations
of free energy minimisation, precision (i.e., the inverse of
uncertainty) is encoded by the gain of cells reporting prediction
error [2]. This directly implicates the classical ascending neuro-
modulatory transmitter systems like dopamine, acetylcholine and
norepinephrine in the encoding of uncertainty. The diverse and
complex interactions between these neurotransmitters and their
role in encoding different forms of uncertainty are still far from
being clearly understood [11,60,61]. Future work will address how
our meta-learning scheme, which links the rate of change of free-
energy (prediction error) to estimation uncertainty (precision), can
help in elucidating the complex interaction between these
neurotransmitters and the activity in their target brain areas.
To conclude, by providing a general framework in which
different perspectives on emotion can be formally interrelated, and
by demonstrating how emotional valence can dynamically regulate
uncertainty, we hope to contribute to paving the way for future
computational studies of emotion in learning and uncertainty.
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